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1. INTRODUCTION
Multinational collective bargaining attempts in Europe have gen-
erally been unsuccessful through the years.' Although the Treaty of
Rome2 acknowledges social policy, the importance of improving em-
ployment conditions, and the desire to harmonize social systems,3 no
* J.D. 1991, University of Pennsylvania; B.S. 1988, Duke University.
Multinational collective bargaining refers to a dialogue between corporations
and trade unions that establishes a collective agreement which affects workers in more
than one country. For an overview of the subject, see H. NORTHRUP & R. ROWAN,
MULTINATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ATTEMPTS: THE RECORD, THE CASES,
AND THE PROSPECTS (Multinational Industrial Relations Series No. 6, 1979); J.
ROJOT, INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: AN ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY
FOR EUROPE (1978). In this comment, multinational collective bargaining specifically
refers to collective bargaining that occurs in the twelve European Economic Commu-
nity [EEC] nations.
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The
Treaty of Rome established the EEC which presently consists of twelve member states.
The founding nations were France, West Germany (now Germany), Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 16 (1987). In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom joined the EEC. Id. at 21. More recently, the EEC admitted Greece
in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Id. at 22.
3 Article 117 provides:
Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improve-
ment of the living and working conditions of labour so as to permit the
equalisation of such conditions in an upward direction.
They consider that such a development will result not only from the
functioning of the Common Market which will favour the harmonisation
of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for under this
Treaty and from the approximation of legislative and administrative
provisions.
Article 118 provides:
(411)
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affirmative provision establishes the impetus to compel pan-European
collective bargaining. However, in 1986, the member states signed the
Single European Act (SEA),4 a document that amends the Treaty of
Rome and serves as the catalyst for an open market of free movement
of goods, people, services, and capital.5 This document seems to indicate
the European Commission's (EC) desir e to facilitate multinational col-
lective bargaining through article 118(b), which states, "[tihe Commis-
sion shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and
labour at the European level which could, if the two sides consider it
desirable, lead to relations based on agreement."' Yet, the drafters of
article 118(b) created an extremely permissive provision which will
probably, by itself, have very little impact in establishing a social dia-
logue between trade unions and multinational corporations. 7
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in con-
formity with its general objectives, it shall be the aim of the Commission
to promote close collaboration between Member States in the social field,
particularly in matters relating to:
-employment,
-labour legislation and working conditions,
-occupational and continuation training,
-social security,
-protection against occupational accidents
and diseases,
-industrial hygiene,
-the law as to trade unions, and collective
bargaining between employers and workers ....
Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at 61-62.
4 30 O.J. EtR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
5 For a broad overview of the SEA, see Myles, Opportunity or Threat: Guide to
1992, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 39 (1990); Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, The
Single European Market: A Practitioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 357 (1989); Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989 (Special Sec-
tion); Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1988 (Special Section). The
SEA reflects the significance placed by the twelve member nations on continuing Euro-
pean economic integration and political cooperation, enhancing the individual Euro-
pean's economic and social situation, and improving the coordination of foreign policies
in order to produce a single voice on international relations. The Single European Act,
3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 20,000.
6 SEA, supra note 4, art. 22, at 9 (inserting article 118(b)). Thus, article 118(b)
contemplates some form of European collective bargaining. Treu, European Unifica-
tion and Italian Labor Relations, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 441, 450 (1990). For a sum-
mary of reactions to the SEA and labor developments, see Employment Regulation in a
United Europe: A Survey of Expectations in the European Community, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 121 (June 22, 1990) (Special Report) [hereinafter Survey of
Expectations].
" Hepple, The Crisis in EEC Labour Law, 16 INDUS. L.J. 77, 85 (1987). Al-
though article 118(b) suggests that multinational collective bargaining agreements are
legally possible, it is doubtful that the European Court of Justice will safeguard its
legal effects. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN AcT 631-32 (2d ed. 1989).
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This comment examines how the SEA has altered both the pros-
pects and the necessity for collective bargaining on a pan-European
level. Section 2 discusses trade union membership in the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) nations, as well as the structure and roles of
both international trade union organizations and international em-
ployer associations. Section 3 outlines the existing obstacles that have
prevented constructive multinational collective bargaining. Section 4 ex-
plores the relationship of the SEA to the concept of social dumping.
Section 5 examines three models, worker participation, pan-European
labor standards, and multinational collective bargaining, which would
theoretically reduce social dumping, and evaluates their potential suc-
cess. Finally, section 6 concludes that some legally enforceable directive
requiring good faith negotiation between multinational enterprises and
labor representatives, which neither prescribes nor limits the terms of
contractual agreements, would establish an effective safeguard against
social dumping induced by the SEA.
2. EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYER ASSOCIATIONS
European trade unions have strong political and religious ties and
the ideology of a trade union is paramount in a worker's membership
selection.8 The notion of trade union membership heavily permeates
European factories and constitutes an important part of European
workers' lives.' In addition to the national and local unions, interna-
tional organizations unite the interests of all European workers,'0 while
corresponding employer associations lobby on behalf of free industry."
2.1. Union Membership in EEC Countries
As with collective bargaining,' 2 the definition of trade union dif-
fers among the EEC countries.' This problem, along with varying cat-
' See E. JACOBS, EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONISM 15 (1973) ("[T]he French worker
would choose between unions . . . that are in origin either communist, Catholic or
socialist."). However, British trade unions differ from their European mainland coun-
terparts in that British unions are most concerned with representing grievances and
pursuing the demands of employees, rather than ideological and political activism. Gal-
lie, Trade Union Ideology and Workers' Conceptions of Class Inequality in France, in
TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 10 (J. Hayward ed. 1980).
' See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text which detail trade union member-
ship rates of the European labor force.
10 See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
IS See K. WALSH, TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP: METHODS AND MEASUREMENT
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 9-10 (1985) (noting that the definition is more rigid
in Ireland and the United Kingdom and broader in West Germany, France, and
1991]
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egorizations of unemployed or retired workers, trainees, and students,
complicates the determination of union membership in each member
nation. 4 A study of union membership density' 5 reports that union
membership in EEC countries ranges from 19.1% in France to 68.8%
in Denmark. 6 However, when calculating these figures using an ad-
justed labor force denominator, the membership rates increase and
range from 25.4% in France to 83.9% in Belgium.
17
2.2. International Union Organizations
Global trade union organizations consist of alliances of national
confederations primarily concerned with political goals, such as mobil-
izing international solidarity of workers. 8 These associations consider
the interests of all member workers, regardless of industry, in pursuing
social reform, and are not involved with specific economic considera-
tions. 9 The three international organizations are the World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU), the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the World Confederation of Labor
(WCL).20  In 1973, the European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC), a regional organization that principally deals with EEC mat-
ters, was established and is currently acknowledged as the official rep-
Belgium).
"' See id. at 16-17 (remarking that many unions try to retain their unemployed
members and a special membership category sometimes exists for retirees).
"5 This calculation employs an unadjusted labor force denominator, which in-
cludes unemployed workers, the armed forces, self-employed workers, and family work-
ers. Id. at 107-08.
16 Id. at 109. The membership rates of other EEC countries are Netherlands
32.1%, West Germany 34.9%, Ireland 36.9%, Italy 38.7%, United Kingdom 45.9%,
Luxembourg 61.8%, and Belgium 63.4%. Id. These figures are from 1981, except for
Ireland which is a 1982 computation. The union membership rates of Greece, Spain,
and Portugal were not calculated in this study.
" Id. at 110. Although the adjusted denominator increases the membership rates
in all EEC countries by decreasing the labor force, these figures are not completely
comparable since the adjustment is not consistent. Denmark (79.0%) only excludes self-
employed and family workers from the labor force. Id. Belgium, Luxembourg (72.7%),
Netherlands (36.0%), and West Germany (41.4%) subtract all unemployed workers,
self-employed workers, and family workers. Id. However, France, Ireland (47.6%), It-
aly (60.6%), and the United Kingdom (50.6%) omit the armed forces as well as the
previously mentioned other groups. Id. Again, these figures are from 1981 and the
adjusted rates from Greece, Spain, and Portugal were not computed in the study.
18 T. DEVos, U.S. MULTINATIONALS AND WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MAN-
AGEMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 125 (1981).
'9 See id.
20 For a description of the operations and membership in these organizations, see
Windmuller, The International Trade Union Movement, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 149, 152-61 (R. Blanpain 3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW].
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resentative of labor within the EEC.2" The ETUC is related neither to
any global organization nor any international trade secretariat,22 and
affiliates with social-democratic, Catholic, and communist unions.23
The leaders of the ETUC coordinate projects, such as the establishment
of particular industry committees, 24 in order to give European workers
greater influence on European institutions, and not merely to "express
pious hopes of European solidarity.
25
International trade union secretariats28 are organizations consist-
ing of national unions which represent workers employed in one partic-
ular industry. Although these organizations work with the ICFTU,
they are independent and vary in size, influence, and national composi-
tion.2" Objectives of the secretariats include exchanging information,
representing employee interests in international affairs, encouraging
union membership, supporting individual unions during labor disputes,
and multinational consulting with management on harmonizing wages
and other working conditions.29
2.3. International Employer Associations
Parallel to the international trade union organizations are em-
ployer associations, such as the International Organization of Employ-
ers (IOE) and the Union of Industries of the European Community
(UNICE), which lobby for free enterprise and minimization of govern-
ment interference, but are not involved with labor negotiations." Addi-
tionally, federations consisting of companies in the same industry exist
in each EEC country on a national level. 3 ' Although these employer
associations frequently help represent corporations in collective bar-
gaining, no international organizations have successfully facilitated
transnational employee relations on behalf of a multinational
21 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 22. For a brief overview of the
ETUC, see Windmuller, supra note 20, at 161-63.
22 See infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of international
trade secretariats.
Is NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 22.
24 Id.
26 M. STEWART, TRADE UNIONS IN EUROPE 25 (1974).
2'6 For a detailed list of international trade union secretariats and their member-
ships, see NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 15-19.
27 DEVos, supra note 18, at 120.
28 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 19. Most secretariats do have Ameri-
can and Japanese affiliates, but some remain entirely European. Id. at 15. Addition-
ally, the secretariats are ideologically socialist-democratic and rarely associate with
communist unions. Id. at 19.
29 STEWART, supra note 25, at 24, 35.
30 Id. at 27-28.
31 ROJOT, supra note 1, at 71.
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enterprise.3 2
3. EXISTING OBSTACLES TO MULTINATIONAL COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Researchers have only uncovered a handful of arrangements that
possess the fundamental qualities of a multinational collective bargain-
ing agreement."3 Several reasons for this lack of multinational collective
bargaining are traditionally recognized: 4 1) varying laws and prac-
tices;35 2) management opposition;36 3) union reluctance and lack of
coordination;3 7 and 4) lack of employee interest.38 Moreover, the differ-
ing national priorities of the EEC countries have also contributed to the
failure of pan-European collective bargaining.3 9
3.1. Varying Laws and Practices
A wide variation of industrial relations laws and practices exists
throughout the EEC member nations. Moreover, only several countries
actually define the concept of a collective bargaining agreement in legal
terms.4" Each country has distinct customs and guidelines concerning
32 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 10-11 (noting that a meeting between
the Western European Metal Trades Employers' Organization and the European Met-
alworkers' Federation ended in dispute).
33 One agreement exists in the European recording and broadcasting industries.
Two international organizations, the International Federation of Musicians and the
International Federation of Actors, have negotiated with the European Broadcasting
Union, an association of chiefly government-owned radio and television companies, for
increased rebroadcast fees for union members. Id. at 533-34.
Another multinational collective bargaining agreement, initially enacted in 1985,
but since renewed indefinitely, exists between Thompson Grand Public, an electrical
appliance manufacturer, and the European Metalworkers' Federation. European
Merger Trend Highlights Need for EC Worker Rights, Union Officials Say, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at A-1, A-2 (Sept. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Merger Trend].
This agreement provides for biannual meetings of a committee composed of both man-
agement and employees to discuss issues that have significant economic impact on the
company. Id. The sessions additionally focus on health and safety issues, as well as
retraining. Id. Nevertheless, this dialogue is a major exception to the overall unwilling-
ness of management to develop "Euro-industrial relations." Blanpain, 1992 and Be-
yond: The Impact of the European Community on the Labour Law Systems of the
Member Countries, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 403, 409 (1990).
"' See Levine, Labor Movements and the Multinational Corporation: A Future
for Collective Bargaining, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 382, 390 (1987); NORTHRUP &
ROWAN, supra note 1, at 534-35.
3 See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
40 G. PERONE, THE LAW OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE COUNTRIES OF
THE EUROPFAN COMMUNITY 1 (1984). The codes of France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
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topics such as determination of union representation4 and the scope
and contents of a collective agreement. 2 For example, several countries
restrict managerial discretion of operations without union approval.4
This lack of harmonization of substantive labor law in the EEC under-
mines any attempt at multinational collective bargaining.
3.2. Management Opposition
Most multinational corporations oppose the concept of multina-
tional collective bargaining for several reasons. First, management fears
that a third arrangement 44 would further increase the threat of strikes
because a new level of potential work stoppage would result. 45 Addi-
tionally, corporations believe that any multinational agreement would
crumble at either the national or local level because of employees' con-
flicting interests.46 A third reservation is the representation of the cor-
poration in a multinational bargaining dialogue.'7 National and local
employee relations are handled by domestic corporate managers or
agents from employer associations.'8 Little coordination exists between
foreign subsidiaries of a multinational corporation, hence a special de-
partment would need to be formed in order to effectuate competent bar-
gaining strategies. 49 Moreover, this international department would
need to hire persons who are fluent in foreign languages in order to
communicate more effectively with labor representatives. Finally, the
diversification of many corporations results in a wide assortment of jobs
and positions that may not be compatible with broad, pan-European
Netherlands, and West Germany all define collective labor agreement. Id. On the other
hand, in Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, and Denmark, no statutory definition exists
and the notion is derived from common use. Id. at 2.
41 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 535. In the EEC countries, represen-
tation is split between unions and independent work councils whose roles differ in each
country. Id.
42 Id. at 536. Management and labor have differing rights and obligations among
the EEC nations in matters as fundamental as the "nature of contractual commitment,
the legal capacity of partners, and the role of the state." Kolvenbach, EEC Company
Law Harmonization and Worker Participation, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 709, 760
(1990). Consequently, no single model of collective bargaining is utilized throughout
the EEC. C6rdova, Collective Bargaining, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW, supra
note 20, at 307, 309.
43 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 536.
41 Multinational negotiations would then be followed by national bargaining, and
lastly, local discussions would occur. Id. See also Enderwick, Trends in the Interna-
tionalisation of Production, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. 9, 10 (No. 6, 1986).
" NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 537.
46 Id. at 537-38.
47 Id. at 538.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 538-39.
1991]
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negotiations.5"
3.3. Union Reluctance and Lack of Coordination
National and local unions have not supported multinational collective
bargaining for fear that transferring bargaining power to an interna-
tional organization would reduce their prestige.5 Without a central
agency possessing authority to negotiate on behalf of the local affiliates,
constructive and consistent negotiations will fail to occur. 2 Moreover,
representation in international trade secretariats is muddled because of
political and religious differences.53 One final consideration is that local
and national unions frequently request import quotas and tariffs when
unemployment rises. 54 These demands are completely inconsistent with
the notion of a multinational agreement. However, the SEA eliminates
the possibility for the national unions to limit import quotas through its
policy of unrestricted free trade of goods. Therefore, only the coordina-
tion and representation problems remain unresolved on the union side.
3.4. Lack of Employee Solidarity
The notion that employees from one country would be willing to
forfeit their paychecks to support the cause of those in another country
for the sake of solidarity has been previously refuted.55 The extent of
international employee support consists of informational flyers and let-
ters from foreign unions to the corporation requesting acceptance of the
strikers' demands. 56 This lack of unity among European employees
reduces labor's power to develop multinational collective bargaining
agreements. 57 Furthermore, national unions that represent employees
1o Id. at 538. For instance, a division which is capital intensive greatly differs
from a labor intensive division, and broad multinational collective bargaining may re-
sult in a subsidiary's inability to handle the costs of the agreement. Id.
5' Levine, supra note 34, at 391.
52 See NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 540-41 (observing the existence of
disputed functions and relationships among international secretariats, regional union
organizations, and national unions in collective bargaining negotiations).
11 Id. at 542. For example, the International Metalworkers' Federation refuses to
accept communist unions located mainly in France and Italy. Id.
54 Id.
" Id. at 544. One instance of non-support, although not exclusively European,
occurred when United States rubber employees were on strike and sought support from
European colleagues. Id. at 545. Not only did the European workers fail to engage in
any sympathetic actions, but also United States import rates increased drastically. Id.
56 Id. at 545.
57 For instance, the leverage of a West German union is diluted when West Ger-
man employees are on strike, while their Spanish co-workers continue to work. West
German Unions Seek Collaboration around EC, in Survey of Expectations, supra note
6, at S-5.
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in the less industrialized EEC nations would not refrain from accepting
a new facility, even to the detriment of their co-workers in more afflu-
ent countries." This reluctant solidarity results from fear that commit-
ting workers to sympathetic acts would "court[] political disaster.
59
3.5. Differing National Priorities
EEC members vary widely in terms of economic strength, politics,
and social values from poorer, developing countries like Portugal,
Spain, and Greece to more industrialized countries such as West Ger-
many, France, and the United Kingdom. These fundamental differ-
ences hinder attempts at pan-European collective bargaining at a gov-
ernmental level. For example, Portugal's government presumably
would not forego potential economic development and increased em-
ployment opportunities in exchange for the trade union solidarity
which would accompany any multinational agreement.60 Moreover, the
members of the EEC all agree that support for workers in other coun-
tries will not undermine their own national goals.6'
4. SOCIAL DUMPING
"Social dumping" is a term of art used to describe the decision of
multinational enterprises that move their facilities from countries with
high labor wages to Greece, Portugal, or Spain, where wage rates and
other social costs are significantly lower.6 2 An appropriate moniker for
this concept in terms of American labor law is the transnational run-
away shop.63 National and local labor unions have long been concerned
with the potential consequences of social dumping. 64 However, the
signing of the SEA has aroused immediate and alarming concerns
58 Protzman, Affluent German Unions Fear 1992, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at
Dl, col. 3, at D5, col. 1.
51 NORTHRUP & ROWAN, supra note 1, at 544.
60 See Levine, supra note 34, at 392-93.
61 Id. at 393.
62 Campbell, The Social Dimension and 1992, in Survey of Expectations, supra
note 6, at S-19, S-20; The Looming Labour Crunch, INT'L MGMT., Feb. 1989, at 26,
27 [hereinafter Looming]. A more technical definition of social dumping is that "com-
panies will invest where the wages and conditions are the cheapest and thereby force
the workers in other countries with higher standards to accept lower standards and
consequently downgrade the employment conditions." Blanpain, supra note 33, at 404
n.3.
63 Shearer, Fact and Fiction Concerning Multinational Labor Relations, 10
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 53 (1977). A runaway shop occurs when an employer
moves his business to another location or temporarily closes his business for anti-union
purposes. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1333 (6th ed. 1990).
64 Shearer, supra note 63, at 53.
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about the increased possibility of social dumping to the effect that the
concept has been referred to as the "European unions' nightmare. "65
This apprehension by the trade unions is hardly unfounded in
light of the wage differences among EEC countries. For instance, an
international human resource director at the Coca-Cola Company re-
marked that hourly wages in 1987 ranged from $3.20 in Portugal to
$19.20 in West Germany. 66 An unnamed West German company also
pays significantly cheaper hourly wages to its workers in Portugal than
to its West German employees .6  Lower wages, however, are not the
only disparities between the poorer EEC nations and the more affluent
ones. Other factors such as longer working hours and fewer vacation
days also contribute to this temptation to move corporate operations to
southern Europe." One West German legislator, wary of these imbal-
ances, believes that the SEA's objective of free movement of goods will
compound and essentially condone these inequalities.69
Public project bidding has already become quite heated due to con-
tinent-wide advertisements for bids, enabling construction companies
with cheap labor costs from southern Europe to outbid their northern
counterparts.70 Unions fear that similar results will occur throughout
the labor sector, eventually causing enterprises located in the northern,
industrialized countries to reduce their wages and benefits in order to
compete, thus harming the individual worker. 1 Moreover, the ETUC
has echoed this concern by noting that the risks of social dumping have
been greatly underrated and sufficient safeguards have not been
advanced. 2
Although trade unions maintain that social dumping will occur
65 The European Community's Single Market Goal: The View from Nam, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 81, 84 (Jan. 18, 1989) (Special Report).
11 Worsening Unemployment in European Community to Be Replaced by Labor
Shortage, Official Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 219, at A-3, A-4 (Nov. 15, 1989)
[hereinafter Worsening Unemployment]. Fiat's Chief Executive Officer noted that the
average annual salary of their German employees is $32,000, while their comparable
Spanish auto workers only earn $13,000 annually. Blanpain, supra note 33, at 405.
Similarly, employees at Renault in Spain are paid 35% less than their French counter-
parts. Id.
67 Betz-Eck, Breaking Down the Walls: Disparities a Barrier to European Unity,
Chi. Tribune, Sept. 18, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 2. The approximate hourly wages are
reported to be $1.50 in Portugal and $15.00 in West Germany. Id.
8 See Protzman, supra note 58, at D5, col. 1. Whereas the average West German
industrial worker labors an average of 1,716 hours per year and receives 30 annual
vacation days, Portuguese employees toil 2,025 hours annually and take only 22 vaca-
tion days. Id.
69 See Betz-Eck, supra note 67, § 4, at 4, col. 1.
70 See id. § 4, at 1, col. 2, at 4, col. 1.
71 Looming, supra note 62, at 27.
712 The Week in Europe, Origin Universal News Service Ltd., Oct. 20, 1988.
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unless some precautions are implemented, others are skeptical and be-
lieve that labor is overreacting." Dissenters contend that lower social
costs are not dispositive in a corporation's decision to relocate in a dif-
ferent country, and other factors such as banking rates, communication
and transportation access, and worker skills are also considered.74 Fur-
thermore, these individuals claim that companies were never restricted
from moving, and that the SEA will not create any additional opportu-
nities for mass social dumping." A recent EC report further down-
played the fear of social dumping by asserting that virtually no differ-
ence in unit wage costs exists in the twelve EEC nations because lower
wages coincide with reduced productivity."1 Consequently, the per-
ceived incentive for corporations to relocate in low wage countries is
illusory." Another argument asserts that social dumping will not occur
due to the existing industrial relations systems of Portugal and Spain
and the national policies that grant the right to form trade unions.
s
Finally, one commentator notes that while cheap labor costs in Greece,
Portugal, and Spain prompt fear of social dumping, no one has cried,
"technological dumping," when the EEC industrial nations mass pro-
duce goods inexpensively with sophisticated machinery. 79 Despite these
contentions, the SEA does create a fertile ground for social dumping to
thrive, and therefore, possible safeguards should be examined.
5. POTENTIAL SAFEGUARDS TO SOCIAL DUMPING
Several mechanisms could help reduce the impact of social dump-
ing. These alternatives include informing and consulting with labor
73 See, e.g., Worsening Unemployment, supra note 66, at A-5 (noting that Coca-
Cola's personnel strategy is based upon "team building and employee involvement, not
the absence or presence of unions.").
7' Looming, supra note 62, at 28. See also Danish Unions, Employers Divided
over Need for EC Influence, in Survey of Expectations, supra note 6, at S-7, S-8
(indicating that Danisco, Denmark's largest food process technology corporation, ex-
plained that it "would be more likely to consider restrictions on biotechnology or taxa-
tion rates when considering where to place a plant.").
75 Looming, supra note 62, at 28.
76 Kellaway, EC Study Rules Out Switch by Industries to Low-Wage Areas, Fi-
nancial Times, July 4, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
7 Id. Without the increased vocational training of workers by low-wage coun-
tries, poor productivity will continue to offset inexpensive labor costs, and therefore,
discourage multinational enterprises from moving their facilities from the highly indus-
trialized EEC nations. Study Shows Few Differences in Labor Costs Throughout EC, 2
1992 - The External Impact of European Unification (BNA) No. 9, July 27, 1990, at
8.
78 Looming, supra note 62, at 28.
79 Amoroso, A Danish Perspective: The Impact of the Internal Market on the
Labor Unions and the Welfare State, 11 Comp. LAB. L.J. 483, 491 (1990).
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representatives about significant corporate decisions,80 establishing pan-
European labor standards on issues such as minimum wage and maxi-
mum hours,"' and facilitating multinational social dialogue.8 2 Although
all three suggestions could alleviate the temptation of social dumping, a
system of multinational collective bargaining would best balance the
competing interests of employees and multinational enterprises.
5.1. Worker Participation and Consultation
Co-determination is the term employed to describe the notion of
labor representation on corporate boards.8 3 This concept of employee
participation is designed to guarantee workers' rights by compelling
disclosure and consultation on pan-European economic decisions di-
rectly affecting a company, such as mergers, acquisitions, or plant clos-
ings. 4 Although this alternative could possibly alleviate the effects of
social dumping by effecting employee influence on corporate decisions,
the Vredeling proposal, 5 a recommendation for worker participation,
was tabled by the EEC in 1986.
5.1.1. Vredeling Proposal
The Vredeling Proposal, named after Henk Vredeling, a former
member of the Commission of the European Communities, was a direc-
tive that would have enabled labor representatives to obtain a general
impression of a corporate enterprise's activities in each nation where
that company operates a facility.8 6 The amended proposal compelled
corporations to provide information voluntarily to employee representa-
tives on an annual basis.81 Moreover, if a company planned to make a
80 See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
83 Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with La-
bor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1343 (1984).
84 See Merger Trend, supra note 33, at A-2.
85 Amendment to the Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Inform-
ing and Consulting Employees, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 217) 3 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Vredeling Proposal]. For a detailed history of the drafting of the Vredeling Propo-
sal, see R. BLANPAIN, F. BLANQUET, F. HERMAN & A. MOUTY, THE VREDELING
PROPOSAL: INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION OF EMPLOYEES IN MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (1983).
88 Hoffman & Grewe, The Vredeling Proposal of the European Commission, 20
STAN. J. INT'L L. 329, 331-33 (1984).
87 Section II, article 3 states:
1. At least once a year, at a fixed date, the management of a parent under-
taking shall forward general but explicit information giving a clear picture
of the activities of the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries as a whole.
. .with a view to the communication of this information to the employees'
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decision that would significantly affect the interests of its employees,
corporate management was commanded to forward accurate informa-
tion to corporate subsidiaries. Local management was then required to
advise the labor representatives of the plan, and also grant a thirty-day
period for reply, during which the corporation was barred from imple-
menting the decision.88 Although these procedures for informing and
consulting with workers also affected enterprises that are exclusively
national in scope, the directive particularly seemed to target multina-
tional corporations, since it applied to parent undertakings employing
at least one thousand workers in the EEC.89
representatives ....
2. This information shall relate in particular to:
(a) structure;
(b) the economic and financial situation;
(c) the probable development of the business and of production and
sales;
(d) the employment situation and probable trends;
(e) investment prospects.
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 85, at 7-8. However, management is not required to
communicate secret and confidential information. Section III, article 7 defines secret
information as "[i]nformation . . . which, if disclosed, could substantially damage the
undertaking's interests or lead to the failure of its plans." Id. at 14.
8 Section II, article 4 provides:
1. Where the management to a parent undertaking proposes to take a
decision ... which is liable to have serious consequences for the interests
of the employees of its subsidiaries . . ., it shall be required to forward
precise information to the management of each subsidiary concerned in
good time before the final decision is taken ....
2. Decisions liable to have serious consequences may in particular relate
to:
(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major parts
thereof; ...
3. [T]he management of each subsidiary concerned shall be required to
communicate in writing without delay the information ... to the employ-
ees' representatives, to ask for their opinion, granting them a period of at
least 30 days . . ., and to hold consultations with them with a view to
attempting to reach agreement on the measures planned in respect to the
employees.
Id. at 9-10.
89 An Update on European Community Law: Report by Professor Janice R. Bel-
lace of Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 171,
at E-1, E-3 (Sept. 1, 1983). Section II, article 2 specifies:
1. This Directive relates to procedures for informing and consulting the
employees:
- of a subsidiary in the Community when a total of at least 1,000
workers is employed in the Community by the parent undertaking
and its subsidiaries as a whole,
- of an undertaking having in the Community one or more estab-
lishments when a total of at least 1,000 workers is employed in the
Community by the undertaking taken as a whole.
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Vehement industry opposition to any social legislation contributed
to the failure of the EEC to adopt the Vredeling Proposal.90 Business-
men contended that any form of co-determination granting labor repre-
sentatives substantial power in strategic decision-making would limit
"management's freedom to manage," and thus impair corporate effi-
ciency. 1 Another argument stemmed from the concern that the cost of
providing the required information would be significant and its prepa-
ration would divert attention from genuine corporate issues.92 Finally,
employers feared that workers would not maintain confidentiality of
disclosed, non-secret information9" that a company would prefer to re-
main private. 4 Since these contentions still remain, any form of strict,
mandated worker participation would be considered unacceptable by
industry. For example, a British employer association continues to pro-
test any co-determination proposals because of its fear that employee
consultation would lead to increased costs and place British corporate
enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. 5 Nevertheless, insistence
upon some mechanism to eliminate future unemployment due to social
dumping caused by the implementation of the SEA will endure as an
economic and political issue.98
5.2. Pan-European Labor Standards
Some industrialists believe that the impact of the SEA on job se-
curity may spark a quest by the politically active European trade un-
ions to push for specific pan-European labor standards.9 These labor
Vredeling Proposal, supra note 85, at 7. Therefore, if a subsidiary located in the EEC
employs 1,000 workers itself, the subsidiary must also furnish its own information.
Hoffman & Grewe, supra note 86, at 339.
9O European Community Ministers Seek Report on Need for Vredeling Informa-
tion Directive, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1067, 1068 (Aug. 20, 1986).
Technically, the failed adoption is exclusively attributable to the United Kingdom's
opposition to the Vredeling Proposal because a unanimous vote is required by internal
rules. Id.
91 Fairlamb, Labor-Business Battle in the EEC, DUN's Bus. MONTH, May 1984,
at 79, 83 (quoting a director of a management association).
92 Id. at 83.
"' See supra note 87 for the Vredeling Proposal's definition of "secret
information."
Fairlamb, supra note 91, at 85.
, Martin & Rider, Opening up Europe, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1988, at 20, 22
(1992 Special Supplement). This particular British concern derives from the fact that
several other EEC members have enacted national legislation concerning co-determina-
tion, and therefore costs, already faced by companies in other nations, would more
significantly effect British corporations. Id.
" Vredeling Measure Sent to Back Burner until 1989, but Concept Remains
Alive, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1234 (Oct. 8, 1986).
" Swoboda, U.S. Will Soon Face Global Labor Standards, Wash. Post, May 28,
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standards might include a minimum wage, maximum hours, and a
minimum working age, in addition to health and safety provisions.98
This concern results from the strong regional and national differences
among the EEC nations and the fact that West German workers earn
more money and have shorter work weeks than their southern Euro-
pean counterparts.9" Therefore, by imposing pan-European standards,
trade unions believe that social dumping would become less favorable to
multinational corporations and would protect the jobs of West German
employees, as well as their higher wages, better social benefits, and
shorter work weeks.1 00 The German and French governments have also
supported the proposition of some minimum working conditions in or-
der to counter social dumping.1 '
However, the United Kingdom is opposed to any social charter of
workers' rights specifically or implicitly calling for pan-European labor
standards, especially minimum wages.'0 2 British economists believe that
if a standard minimum wage is imposed, unemployment in the United
Kingdom would increase drastically.1 0 3 In addition to the fear that a
pan-European minimum wage would result in the growth of unem-
ployment, which would counter efforts to reduce the consequences of
social dumping, other drawbacks exist. The actual choice of the mini-
mum wage rate with respect to each member country poses significant
difficulty. Since each nation currently possesses its own monetary stan-
dard, subject to fluctuating exchange rates, the determination of compa-
rable and fair minimum wages would be elusive. Additionally, if a
minimum wage were imposed, its eventual adjustment due to inflation
would also cause problems because each country has distinct annual
inflation rates.'0 4 Although employee productivity could guide the
standardization of wages, productivity would need to be defined and
1989, at H3, col. 4.
98 1992: The Bad News, INT'L MGMT., Sept. 1988, at 22, 25.
" See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
100 1992, A Threat to Dogmatic Labour Unions, INT'L MGMT., Dec. 1988, at 73.
101 Gapper, Skills Shortage Stalls the Worker's March, Financial Times, Sept. 5,
1990, at 20, col. 3.
.0. See Kaluzvnska, Britain Refuses to Budge over Workers' Rights in Commu-
nity, Reuters, Oct. 29, 1989.
10" The economists project that if the minimum wage was set at 50% of the aver-
age wage, then 500,000 jobs would be lost. Moreover, if the minimum wage was
equivalent to 68% of the average, unemployment would increase by 1,400,000. EEC
Pay Code 'Will Cost Jobs', Sunday Telegraph, Dec. 10, 1989, at 25.
104 In 1989, the inflation rates of the EEC member nations were: Belgium 3.1%,
Denmark 4.8%, France 3.5%, West Germany 2.8%, Greece 13.7%, Ireland 4.1%, Italy
6.2%, Luxembourg 3.4%, Netherlands 1.1%, Portugal 12.6%, Spain 6.8%, and United
Kingdom 7.8%. EUROPEAN MARKETING DATA AND STATISTICS 1991, at 147 (26th
ed.).
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uniformly applied in all collective bargaining agreements.1 05 Finally, an
enforcement problem would exist, especially in companies where labor
representation is not present, and in poorer countries, where individu-
als might work longer hours for less pay rather than risk unemploy-
ment. In the absence of a community-wide policing commission, self-
regulation is unlikely, and the system of pan-European labor standards
would be undermined. Nonetheless, if these barriers to pan-European
labor standards are overcome, doubt exists as to whether the EEC
could set minimum wages at a level that would curb social dumping.106
5.3. Multinational Collective Bargaining
A system of collective bargaining that involves negotiations be-
tween multinational corporations and employees in more than one
country would be the optimal safeguard against the social dumping that
could result from the implementation of the SEA. The drafting of pan-
European agreements by individual corporations and international un-
ions in areas affecting job security, such as new technology, maximum
hours, wage scales, and plant closings would increase workers' rights
and prevent potential social dumping.1' Local union representatives
could then discuss more specific terms and conditions of employment
with the local management of each facility.108 By allowing each mul-
tinational enterprise and corresponding labor representative to tailor
the social dialogue to the particular needs of the employees without
dictating mandatory EEC standards, individual and voluntary agree-
ments would be facilitated in a less intrusive manner. 0 9 Due to differ-
ences in the form and content of employee participation within the
same country, this more flexible approach toward initiating social dia-
logue appears attractive." 0 Nevertheless, in order for multinational col-
lective bargaining to advance, the obstacles that have previously pre-
105 Treu, supra note 6, at 456.
106 Jacobs, The Netherlands and the Social Dimension of the Single European
Market, 11 Comp. LAn. L.J. 462, 468 (1990).
107 Regulation of Behavior of Multinationals Advocated by International Metal-
workers, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) No. 28, at 909, 910 (Apr. 18,
1984) (quoting the general secretary of the International Metalworkers' Federation).
108 Id.
109 See Fairlamb, supra note 91, at 85 (declaring that a compulsory system of
employee involvement would force many corporations to scrap their currently successful
agreements in order to meet mandatory, pan-European structures and standards).
110 Treu, supra note 6, at 453. Since the distinct political, cultural, and social
identities of each EEC nation are intimately tied to collective labor relations, an ap-
proach that would strongly regulate both the structure and content of European collec-
tive bargaining agreements would be impracticable. Id. at 448-49.
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vented social dialogue... must be reevaluated in light of the
consequences of the SEA, and furthermore, a more stringent statement
of policy than Article 118(b)" 2 must be implemented.
5.3.1. Overcoming the Obstacles
The previously described obstacles of varying laws and practices,
management opposition, union reluctance and lack of coordination, lack
of employee solidarity, and differing national priorities are surmount-
able. Obviously, the differing statutory schemes of the EEC nations
will continue to exist. However, the EEC can feasibly issue a directive
compelling multinational enterprises to open a dialogue with labor rep-
resentatives without disrupting national laws." 3
Both management opposition and union reluctance hinge on the
lack of coordination in conducting multinational negotiations. Yet these
administrative problems can hardly be deemed an impediment. Man-
agement contends that to facilitate multinational collective bargaining, a
special, multilingual personnel department would have to be estab-
lished. Its reservations result from the additional costs involved in creat-
ing such a department. However, since corporations could spread the
cost to the general public, this financial argument is meritless. In fact,
multinational enterprises might even reduce their overall costs through
pan-European collective bargaining agreements." 4 On the labor side,
international trade union secretariats already exist and could organize a
bargaining strategy on behalf of a corporation's employees." 5 More-
over, the national and local trade unions' fear of losing prestige would
be allayed by the two-tiered bargaining system wherein the local repre-
sentatives could negotiate for specific, plant-related terms and condi-
tions of employment. Companies also traditionally disfavor any form of
labor participation because of the feared interference with the manage-
"' See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text which describes in detail the
obstacles impairing multinational collective bargaining.
12 See supra text accompanying note 6 for the content of Article 118(b).
113 Multinational collective bargaining agreements would also assist the imple-
mentation of subsequent directives into practice, despite the differing labor relations
systems of the member states. Kolvenbach, supra note 42, at 788.
114 Note, The Vredeling Directive: The EEC's Failed Attempt to Regulate Mul-
tinational Enterprises and Organize Collective Bargaining, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 967, 991 (1988). If unions could coordinate their representation and focus on
collective bargaining issues, then employees would benefit economically, which would
enhance productivity, thus decreasing corporate expenses. Id. at n.151.
115 The ETUC maintains that pan-European collective bargaining is its ultimate
goal. Union Confederation Focuses Efforts on Implications of Single Market, in Sur-
vey of Expectations, supra note 6, at S-3, S-4.
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rial right to make business-related decisions.' 16 However, by instituting
a system of multinational collective bargaining that neither mandates
nor limits topics in an arrangement, each corporation could discuss
with the representative trade union or an international labor organiza-
tion the extent of workers' rights pursuant to a mutually acceptable
agreement. This individually tailored contract would act as a compro-
mise that would be less intrusive than either mandatory consultation
with workers or strict EEC standards concerning minimum wage and
other conditions.
The fourth obstacle, lack of employee solidarity, is concededly dif-
ficult to alter, even if trade unions explained to employees the signifi-
cant consequences that the SEA could have on their job security. How-
ever, the implementation of a multinational collective bargaining
agreement that regulates specific conditions of employment for workers
in several different countries would encourage employees to support
their foreign counterparts. Since the agreement would affect workers
from several countries directly, feelings of loyalty and solidarity would
grow. Therefore, if a multinational enterprise breached the agreement
in one country, foreign co-workers would demonstrate their support be-
cause the contract would affect their own personal employment. More-
over, a Spanish union official acknowledged labor's desire to create bar-
gaining committees that would coordinate union action at the EEC
headquarters of multinational corporations, thus enhancing overall
worker solidarity.""
Finally, the national priorities of the twelve EEC nations will al-
ways differ to some extent. However, universal government policies in-
clude the reduction of unemployment and the bettering of living condi-
tions for citizens. To these ends, multinational collective bargaining
presents a way to preserve jobs in the more affluent nations, while in-
creasing existing wages and not discouraging business development in
poorer countries.
5.3.2. Implementation of Multinational Collective Bargaining
Article 118(b) of the SEA passively indicates a desire to effect
multinational collective bargaining in the EEC. However, current vol-
untary guidelines for multinational corporations demonstrate that un-
... The UNICE fears that EEC legislation concerning labor participation would
jeopardize the economic savings generated by the SEA. Id. at S-4.
"1 Modernization Accelerates in Spain in Anticipation of Single Market, in Sur-
vey of Expectations, supra note 6, at S-9, S-10. For instance, these committees could
oppose accelerated production in a Spanish facility while British co-workers are on
strike. Id.
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enforceable and permissive declarations will not assist the facilitation of
a social dialogue between labor and multinational enterprise.
On June 21, 1976, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) announced voluntary guidelines for mul-
tinational enterprises on several issues, including disclosure of informa-
tion, employment, and industrial relations." 8 These guidelines, if fol-
lowed, could have resulted in a system of multinational collective
bargaining."" Management viewed the promulgation of voluntary
guidelines favorably, but labor believed that without an enforcement
mechanism, the guidelines were not satisfactory. 2 ° Despite this
favorable endorsement by management and the significant promotion of
the guidelines, support from multinational corporations has been less
than expected.. 2 1 Furthermore, the guidelines have failed to operate as
a dispute mechanism.' Several commentators claim that evidence
which shows relatively few alleged infractions provides support of com-
pliance by multinational firms.' 3 However, similar evidence can also
'll D. CAMPBELL & R. ROWAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE
OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 1 (Multinational Industrial Relations
Series No. 11, 1983).
" The OECD guidelines declare that multinational enterprises should:
1. Respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade unions
... and engage in constructive negotiations, either individually or
through employers' organizations, with such employee organizations with
a view to reaching agreements on employment conditions...
2(b). Provide to representatives of employees information which is needed
for meaningful negotiations on the conditions of employment;...
6. In considering changes in their operations which would have major ef-
fects upon the livelihood of their employees, in particular in the case of the
closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or dismissals; provide rea-
sonable notice of such changes to representatives of their employees...
9. Enable authorized representatives of their employees to conduct negoti-
ations on collective bargaining or labour management relations issues with
representatives of management who are authorized to take decisions on the
matters under negotiation.
B. LIEBHABERG, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
EUROPE 80-82 (1980).
110 Id. at 83.
11" See R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1982-1984, at 182 (1985) (indicating that the draft-
ers expected multinational enterprises to specifically mention the existence of and com-
pliance with the voluntary guidelines in annual reports). A survey established that less
than three percent of the United Kingdom's multinational enterprises publicly endorse
the voluntary regulations. Hamilton, Initiatives Undertaken by International Or-
ganisations in the Field of Employee Information and Consultation in Multinational
Undertakings (I.L.O., O.E.C.D., U.N.), in EMPLOYEE CONSULTATION AND INFORMA-
TION IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 95, 111 (J. Vandamme ed. 1986). Similar
responses were received in France and West Germany. Id. at 111-12.
"I1 BLANPAIN, supra note 121, at 181.
11 CAMPBELL & ROWAN, supra note 118, at 12. See also Note, The Proposed
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signal labor's belief that alleging a violation is futile because of the
ineffective enforcement process.""
Regardless of whether multinational corporations presently follow
the OECD guidelines, the increased temptation of social dumping re-
sulting from the SEA's implementation requires some legally enforcea-
ble, mandatory directive that compels multinational social dialogue.
This directive should require that multinational enterprises125 initiate a
dialogue with labor representatives. Once negotiations have com-
menced, a good faith bargaining requirement is necessary to ensure the
signing of some written agreement. However, particular terms of these
arrangements should be individually tailored to satisfy the competing
interests of each multinational corporation and its employees. Conse-
quently, the scope of such agreements should not be limited, nor should
any specific terms of employment be prescribed. Finally, an EEC body
empowered to enforce this proposed directive must be established, oth-
erwise the desired prevention of social dumping could not be achieved
and the only safeguard would be voluntary compliance by multina-
tional corporations with Article 118(b) or the OECD guidelines. 2
6. CONCLUSION
The SEA's goal of free movement of goods, people, services, and
capital across the EEC will affect the business of multinational corpo-
rations. If the present rules regarding workers' rights remain un-
changed, these financially motivated multinational enterprises will have
both the unrestrained opportunity and the temptation to move manu-
facturing facilities from more affluent countries to nations where labor
is significantly cheaper. In addressing the imminent threat of social
dumping, three potential safeguards exist: a worker participation and
consultation model, pan-European labor standards, and multinational
Vredeling Directive: A Modest Proposal or the Exportation of Individual Democracy?,
70 VA. L. REV. 1469, 1495 (1984) (stating that the voluntary code is not subject to
widespread abuse by multinational corporations).
124 Three reasons are offered for the inadequacy of the voluntary guidelines: 1)
the complaint process is lengthy and cumbersome; 2) no authoritative enforcement ma-
chinery exists; and 3) many employees are unaware of the existence of these guidelines.
Hamilton, supra note 121, at 109-11.
125 It is impractical for every multinational enterprise to be subject to such a
scheme. Therefore, the directive should apply mainly to corporations that would signifi-
cantly reduce labor costs by implementing social dumping maneuvers. A threshold level
of workers necessary to trigger application of the directive would need to be promul-
gated in order to achieve this result.
121 See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text which discount the effective-
ness of the OECD voluntary guidelines. No foundation exists to believe that a very
permissive EEC amendment, such as Article 118(b), would be any more effective.
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collective bargaining. Although both a mandatory worker information
and consultation model and standard pan-European working conditions
could feasibly eliminate the possibility of social dumping, a scheme that
compels multinational collective bargaining would be both less intrusive
and more effective. A system of multinational collective bargaining
strikes a compromise between workers' rights and corporate function
while resolving the issue of social dumping. It balances employees'
desires for both job security and a voice in the corporate decision-mak-
ing process with the economic constraints of competition and manage-
ment's need for unfettered control. By implementing a legally enforcea-
ble directive requiring good faith negotiation, but without requiring or
limiting the terms of such an arrangement, this balance can be effec-
tively achieved.
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